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In 2013, the British Prime Minister David 
Cameron announced that if re-elected, he would 
renegotiate the UK’s relationship with the EU 
and subsequently hold an in-or-out vote on 
Britain’s future EU membership. Following an 
agreement in the European Council on a new 
settlement between the EU and the UK, the 
date for the referendum has been set on 23 June 
2016. While Mr. Cameron is campaigning for 
the UK to stay in the EU, a “Brexit” continues 
to be a plausible scenario.  
For those wanting to leave the EU, the Swiss 
integration “model” has often been 
characterised as an alternative to the UK’s 
membership within the EU. For example, 
British EU MEP Daniel Hannan stated that the 
UK should leave the EU and secure a more 
beneficial integration deal, similar to the one 
Switzerland enjoys as a third-state through 
bilateral agreements.1 The mayor of London 
Boris Johnson, who first coined the term 
“Britzerland” proposed that Switzerland and the 
UK could form a “new outer tier of the 
European Union” which would “trade” with the 
For those wishing to see the UK exit from 
the EU, Switzerland has become a poster 
child, an example of how a country outside 
the EU can retain access to the EU’s 
internal market, thereby flourishing 
economically, and yet retaining its 
sovereignty and independence. But can a 
similar arrangement to that of Switzerland 
really provide a suitable alternative – a 
“Plan B” – for the UK’s relationship with 
the EU? With the referendum providing 
potential exit for the UK from the EU 
rapidly approaching, a Swiss-type plan B 
deserves some serious consideration. This 
paper examines the central claims made by 
those who see Switzerland as a model for 
the UK’s future relationship with the EU 
and argues that the Swiss model is no Holy 
Grail for the UK.  
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EU and “help set the norms of trade”. He also 
stated that “we could construct a relationship 
with the EU that more closely resembled that of 
Norway or Switzerland – except that we would 
be inside the single market Council, and able to 
shape legislation”.2  
Three central claims are regularly characterised 
as advantages if the UK was to adopt the Swiss 
integration model:  
1) The UK would be able to swiftly conclude 
loose bilateral agreements with the EU, 
providing access to the EU internal market, 
while avoiding the more controversial 
aspects of European integration, such as free 
movement of persons.3  
2) The UK would be able to “regain” its 
national sovereignty and democratic 
accountability, as it would have lower 
exposure to EU legislation.4   
3) The UK would prosper because it would 
avoid large direct contributions to the EU 
budget.  
 
So far, however, there has been little in-depth 
research into whether a deal modelled on 
Switzerland’s relationship with the EU would be 
feasible or appropriate for the UK. Moreover, 
the few publications on the matter are outdated.5 
In view of the forthcoming referendum, this 
paper therefore seeks to provide an independent 
contribution to the attention of British 
stakeholders. It does not aim at taking sides on 
the in/out question – as this is for the British 
voters to decide – but only at assessing the pros 
and cons of a Swiss-type agreement in relation 
to arguments of the “Brexiters”. Chapter two 
evaluates the first Eurosceptic claim by 
introducing the reader to the historical 
background of EU-Swiss relations. Chapter 
three then considers the current Swiss 
integration model and provides an assessment of 
the other two claims. Lastly, the paper assesses 
some recent developments in EU-Swiss 
relations and reflects on the future of 
bilateralism as we know it today.  
 
2. HISTORICAL INSIGHTS TO EU-SWISS 
RELATIONS  
The origins of the bilateral agreements  
The end of the Cold War and the creation of the 
internal market were game changers – not only 
for the EU, but also for those Western 
European countries, which had earlier decided 
to stay outside the EU and instead join the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Not 
wanting to be left outside the development of 
the internal market, these countries, including 
Switzerland, decided to deepen their relations 
with Brussels (at the time, the only significant 
agreement they had concluded with the EU was 
a free trade agreement on industrial products in 
the 1970s). Meanwhile, the European 
Commission made it clear that it wanted to deal 
with EFTA countries en bloc in order to reduce 
transaction costs and avoid cherry-picking 
integration deals. The seven EFTA countries 
were thus left with two alternatives: either to 
join a new integration scheme (the European 
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Economic Area or EEA) allowing them access 
to the internal market, or join the EU itself. 
Three of them chose the first option (Norway, 
Iceland and Liechtenstein), while the three 
others opted for the second (Sweden, Austria 
and Finland).6 
To almost everyone’s surprise, the Swiss people 
rejected the accession to the EEA in a 1992 
referendum and froze its EU membership 
application. As a result, the Swiss economy was 
in danger of being disadvantaged due to the 
constrained access to the internal market 
compared to its EU and EEA EFTA 
competitors. Consequently, the Swiss 
government decided to seek a bilateral 
integration framework with the EU. Brussels’ 
immediate reaction was lukewarm and the 
European Commission ignored these demands 
in the beginning.7  
After several months of stalemate, the Swiss 
were, however, able to soften the EU position 
through a twofold strategy. First, they convinced 
their European counterparts that their long-term 
goal was still full EU accession. Second, 
Switzerland would continue the EU-isation 
process of its legal order on an “autonomous” 
basis (see below). As a result, the EU 
unenthusiastically accepted the principle of 
negotiating a new bilateral relation with 
Switzerland. The Commission however 
understood that there was an “asymmetry of 
needs” between Switzerland and the EU and 
delayed the opening of negotiations (which took 
almost two years to start).8 The authors’ own 
research show that between 1993 and 1994, the 
European Commission’s strategists considered 
that the EU was in a good bargaining position. 
They often depicted the Swiss government as 
“anxious to obtain access to the Single Market 
and to certain Community programmes”. More 
precisely, they stressed that Switzerland was in 
desperate need of EU market access. As a 
relatively small market, a large part of Swiss 
exports were destined for its immediate 
neighbours. Therefore, the strategists advised 
against the conclusion of agreements that 
appeared to favour Switzerland 
disproportionately and the EU made sure that 
any such bilateral relation was not tailored to 
meet Swiss demands only. Consequently, out of 
the 18 cooperation issues submitted by the 
Swiss, only seven were put on the negotiation 
agenda. Thus, the EU postponed more than half 
of Swiss demands. The Union also imposed two 
issues that the Swiss did not want, one being the 
free movement of persons.9 Remarkably, the EU 
did so while acknowledging at the same time 
Switzerland’s critical importance as an economic 
partner: “Switzerland is among the Community’s 
most important trading partners, being its 
second largest individual export market (after 
the US)”.10 
The ensuing Switzerland-EU negotiations were 
at times difficult and sometimes stalled for 
months (road transport agreement), mainly due 
to the European Commission’s careful approach 
to the negotiations. For instance, the 
Commission made use of the principle of 
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“appropriate parallelism”, meaning that the all 
negotiations had to progress at equal speed. In 
1999, after many do-or-break situations, the first 
package of bilateral agreements (“B1”) was 
signed, containing seven sectorial agreements.11 
Previously, the EU had secured a so called 
“guillotine clause” attached to all these treaties. 
This means that if any one of the B1 agreements 
is not ratified or (later) terminated by 
Switzerland, all the others automatically fall. 
The B1 entered into force in June 2002, after a 
lengthy ratification process and almost ten years 
after the negative EEA referendum.12 Another 
set of bilateral agreements, the Bilaterals II 
(“B2”), was signed in 2004. These consisted of 
nine separate agreements, with the most 
important one allowing Switzerland to join the 
Schengen passport-free area - however, not until 
December 2008.  
What does this tell us about the UK case?  
The process and outcome of the EU-Swiss 
negotiations allow us to make five observations 
about the first claim of those in favour of a 
“Swiss model” for the UK, namely that bilateral 
agreements can be concluded in a swift manner.  
Firstly, the bilateral negotiations were time-
consuming. Due to its status as a “third” state, 
i.e. Switzerland being neither part of the EU nor 
the EEA, no institutional framework was in 
place to centralise its negotiations. As a result, 
Switzerland faced different EU representatives 
with different agendas for each of the sectors 
negotiated, which delayed negotiations 
significantly. As the bilateral agreements are, 
legally speaking, “mixed agreements”, 
signature/ratification was in addition needed not 
only by the EU but also by all the EU Member 
States.  
The case of a possible UK departure from the 
EU is somewhat different. While Article 50 
TEU does not go into much detail on how the 
withdrawal of a Member State and the 
“framework for its future relationship” with the 
EU would work in practice, it does nevertheless 
provide a negotiation framework. That being 
said, the existence of this legal provision alone 
does not guarantee a quick agreement 
conclusion and ratification.13 Article 50 TEU 
states that any withdrawal agreement is to be 
negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) 
TEU, which in itself provides for a rather 
lengthy procedure involving the Commission 
and the Council. The agreement is then 
concluded by the Council, acting by qualified 
majority, and after obtaining the consent by the 
European Parliament.14 In addition, the 
withdrawal treaty of the UK may, as in the 
bilateral agreements between the EU and 
Switzerland, actually “have to be concluded as a 
mixed agreement”. This could lead to a long 
ratification procedure15  - potentially even longer 
than in the case of Switzerland, as 27 Member 
States would have to ratify instead of what was 
15 Member States for the Swiss. 
Secondly, even if one takes into account the 
different economic size of the UK, it is difficult 
to argue that the British negotiators would not 
face serious challenges to secure a (new) close 
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relationship with the EU. Indeed, concluding a 
classical free trade agreement would probably 
not be any source of trouble. However, securing 
an access to the internal market or the core of 
European integration – like the Swiss did in the 
1990s – would be a more complicated task 
legally and politically speaking.  
It is true that the UK is a larger and 
economically more relevant player than 
Switzerland. In the case of a Brexit, the British 
government might therefore possess more 
bargaining power than the Swiss had. Having 
said that, in relative terms, it appears that the 
UK is not really a more important trade partner 
to the EU[27] than Switzerland was in the early 
1990s to the then much smaller EU[12]. The 
UK would become the second largest trade 
partner of the EU but so was Switzerland at the 
time. As the situations are surprisingly similar 
(see table below), it is farfetched to state that the 
UK “can expect to do far, far better” than what 
Switzerland achieved.16  
Source: World Trade Organization, International Trade 
statistics 2001, Geneva, 2001: http://bit.ly/20Tk59l; 
European Commission, “Statistics”, DG trade Export 
Helpdesk, 16 April 2016 : http://bit.ly/1gJTvGF.  
 
Thirdly, some EU Member States might oppose 
the opening of ambitious bilateral negotiations 
with the UK for fear of reinforcing their own 
Eurosceptic forces (by showing that there is a 
life after EU membership).17 Switzerland did not 
encounter this problem as these political forces 
were less powerful in the early 1990s. 
Fourthly, when the EU and Switzerland 
negotiated the bilateral agreements, the EU did 
not want to “reward” the Swiss for rejecting 
EEA-membership by offering them deeper and 
more tailor-made integration than the EEA 
EFTA countries. Indeed, such a situation might 
have given incentives for these countries to 
leave the EEA and seek a “Swiss deal”.18 To this 
day, the EEA still offers the deepest form of 
integration for third-countries and most EU 
officials are relatively pleased about its smooth 
functioning.19 Thus, while the outcome of any 
potential negotiations between the EU and the 
UK cannot be predicted, it is unlikely that the 
EU would swiftly accept all British integration 
demands. “Sensitive” topics, such as the free 
movement of persons, would in all likelihood 
feature on the negotiation agenda so as to avoid 
precedents that might be exploited by other 
“close” neighbours.  
Fifthly, Switzerland in its bilateral negotiations 
between 1993 and 2006 continuously stressed 
that full EU accession was a “strategic goal”.20 
Thus, in the EU’s perspective, relations with 
Switzerland rested on the idea that bilateralism 
was a provisional solution.21 In the case of a 
Brexit, it is the contrary. The long-term goal of 
the UK would be to leave the EU and to secure 
long-lasting bilateral agreements with no 
 
EU[12] trade 
with           
Switzerland 
(1990) 
EU[27] 
trade with             
the UK 
(2015) 
Exports of goods 
based on trade 
value (share in % 
of total exports) 
10.5 14.8 
Imports of goods 
based on trade 
value                                  
(share in % of 
total exports) 
8.1 12.6  
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immediate, if any, accession perspectives. EU 
negotiators might therefore not have an 
incentive to accommodate UK demands in the 
same way as they accommodated Swiss 
demands. 
3. THE SWISS INTEGRATION MODEL 
TODAY  
As seen, the Swiss bilateral model is much more 
complex than it might seem at first sight. It took 
around 10 years to negotiate two sets of sectorial 
bilateral agreements and negotiations were at 
times complex and even stalled. The following 
section will look at the actual functioning of 
Swiss bilateralism and thereby evaluate the 
second and third claims made in the 
introduction.  
Economic and trade relations between the EU 
and Switzerland are today governed through B1 
and B2, as well as a Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA) dating back to the 1970s. Currently more 
than 120 bilateral agreements are in force, out of 
which about 20 are considered to “form the 
nucleus of the bilateral law” (most of them B1 
or B2).22 What is rather unique about these 
agreements is that there is no overarching 
association or framework agreement – each 
treaty has its own governing structure. Strictly 
speaking, it is thus not possible to speak of a 
single Swiss “model”, but rather of a series of 
Swiss models.  
Most agreements between the EU and 
Switzerland are governed by so called Joint or 
Mixed Committees, composed of 
representatives of the EU and Switzerland. The 
main task of these committees is to manage the 
agreement in question and to ensure its proper 
implementation. This includes information 
exchange on the development of the agreement, 
relevant legislative developments in Switzerland 
and the EU, legal changes to the agreements, or 
the effects of new jurisdiction on the 
agreement.23 As compared to, for example, the 
EEA Agreement, where disputes related to the 
participation of the EEA EFTA States are 
solved in a single Joint Committee, dispute 
resolution under the EU-Swiss Bilaterals thus 
currently takes place in a range of joint 
committees that operate separately from each 
other.24  
As will be seen below, the Swiss model is 
however not only about bilateral cooperation 
agreements, but also about autonomous 
alignment to EU regulation.  
Sovereignty and democratic accountability 
Adaptation to EU legislation 
Swiss-EU bilateral agreements do not follow a 
single mechanism of how to manage changes in 
EU legislation. While a few agreements, in 
principle, are entirely static in nature in the sense 
that no changes to the provisions of the 
agreements are envisaged, most agreements 
underline the principle of “equivalence of 
legislation”. This principle means that in case 
either Switzerland or the EU adopts new 
legislation relevant to the agreement in question, 
the two parties enter a consultation procedure 
and the joint committee can then make 
“technical changes” to specific annexes and 
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protocols of the agreement in question.25 In 
addition, there are some agreements where 
Switzerland explicitly commits itself to adopt 
future EU legislation in certain areas.26  It should 
also be mentioned that Switzerland 
complements what is strictly foreseen in the 
bilateral agreements in terms of adapting to new 
EU legislation with the practice of “autonomous 
adaptation”, meaning that it voluntarily adopts a 
range of EU legislation into national law.27  A 
prominent case is the introduction of the so 
called “Cassis-de-Dijon” principle, which allows 
products that are lawfully produced in the EU to 
be imported into Switzerland without any 
further authorisation or certification. The Swiss 
do not benefit from reciprocity though. 
 
As a result, the EU has had an increasingly 
strong influence on Swiss domestic legislation in 
recent years. During the last two decades, 
Switzerland has adapted to a large number of 
new EU legislation relating to the bilateral 
agreements. During the 1990-2010 period, 
almost one-third of all Swiss legal reforms 
originated directly or indirectly from EU law.28 
This largely silent process left a significant 
footprint in Swiss domestic law.29 A central 
factor in the adaptation to new EU legislation is 
the need for Switzerland to keep its legislations 
as EU-compatible as possible. Otherwise, the 
Swiss economy could end up losing its access to 
the internal market. This particular situation has 
left several observers to conclude that 
Switzerland is in fact nothing more than a 
“passive executor” of EU law.30  For the UK, a 
Swiss-style arrangement would thus mean a 
continuous adaptation to evolving EU 
legislation in the fields of potential future 
bilateral agreements. The UK would hence not 
cede to be exposed to EU legislation.  
No access to decision-making, limited 
decision-shaping powers 
Switzerland does not have any access to the 
formal decision-making structures of the EU.31 
There are no Swiss Parliamentarians in the 
European Parliament and Switzerland does not 
participate in any Council formations, including 
the Competitiveness Council (dealing with 
internal market issues). With regards to the 
ability to shape legislations at the experts’ level 
before they end up at the Parliament and 
Council (“decision-shaping”), Switzerland has 
the right to speak, albeit only in certain areas 
such as air transport.32 The practice allowing 
EEA EFTA experts to participate in 
“comitology” committees33 as observers has 
however not been extended in a general manner 
to Switzerland.34  
While it is unclear as to how much influence 
over European legislations the UK would be 
able to negotiate with a Swiss-type integration, it 
remains a fact that no third country has gained 
comprehensive access to EU decision-making so 
far. Furthermore, decision-shaping powers are 
limited – even more so for Switzerland than for 
the EEA EFTA States. This is a very different 
situation from the one the UK enjoys now, 
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where the UK is one of the main players when 
new EU legislation is negotiated.  
In this regard, one element should be taken into 
account: the recent deal between the other EU 
Member States and the UK on a future 
relationship (for a UK in the EU) provides an 
“alert and safeguard mechanism” in case of an 
inflow of workers “of an exceptional magnitude 
over an extended period of time” from other 
Member States. It also grants any Member State 
a four-year “emergency-break” on in-work 
benefits.35 Switzerland does not currently benefit 
from such an emergency break.36 At this point, it 
is unclear whether the UK outside the EU 
would be able to maintain such arrangements on 
the free movement of persons.  
EU programmes and agencies 
Switzerland has negotiated cooperation with or 
participation in a range of EU programmes and 
agencies (sometimes outside of the B1 and B2). 
For more than 20 years, it has, for example, 
participated in the EU’s research framework 
programmes. It also participates in some 
agencies such as Frontex37 or the European 
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)38, and has 
established cooperation with the European 
Police College, CEPOL. As cooperation with or 
participation in EU agencies has to be 
negotiated on a case-by-case basis, the extent of 
participation may vary considerably. 
Switzerland’s participation in agencies is 
however far more limited than, for example, 
EEA EFTA countries39. In general, access to 
EU programmes and agencies for third 
countries takes place on EU’s terms.40 The fact 
that the number of agencies and regulatory 
authorities has grown exponentially over the 
recent years and that these enjoy increasing 
supervisory and decision-making powers, in 
particular in the areas of financial services and 
network industries, has become a challenge for 
non-EU states.41 
In this context it should also be mentioned, that 
Switzerland’s future participation in two 
important EU programmes – Erasmus + and 
Horizon 2020 – remains uncertain due to the 
acceptance of the Swiss popular initiative on 
mass immigration from 2014 (see below).  
If the UK goes for a Swiss-type integration, 
negotiation on participation in some EU 
agencies and programmes might be possible. In 
addition to the required financial contribution, 
the UK should however expect to have little say 
on the terms of participation and keep in mind 
that participation might well be coupled to 
other, more sensitive, political issues.  
 
No free lunch: The enlargement 
contribution 
One of the central arguments of British 
Eurosceptics is that if the UK left the EU, it 
would avoid direct contribution to the EU 
budget. While it is true that non-EU states do 
not contribute directly to the EU budget, it 
should be highlighted that Switzerland has since 
2008 participated in various projects designed to 
reduce economic and social disparities in an 
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enlarged EU with CHF 1.302 billion (GBP 930 
million).42 Similarly, Norway for example 
annually contributes around 388 million euro 
per year through the current EEA and Norway 
Grants scheme for the period 2014-2021, 
pending ratification of the agreement.43  
In addition, the B1 and B2 entail a range of 
costs related to their implementation. For 
example, in the B1 the overland transport 
agreement brought along costs relating to the 
shift of traffic from road to rail.44 Switzerland 
also pays for its participation in EU agencies and 
programmes. A report of the Federal Council 
found that the maintenance of the existing 
bilateral agreements, the participation in EU 
programmes/agencies and the financial 
enlargement contribution would generate 
payments up to 718 million Swiss Francs for the 
year 2013 (GBP 517 million).45  Although it of 
course needs to be acknowledged that net 
payments are in reality lower, as many 
programmes generate returns, the overall sum is 
relatively high. In addition, total payments might 
well rise in the coming years, as Switzerland is 
expected make a new contribution to reduce 
economic and social disparities from 2016 
onwards.  
Any type integration modelled on the Swiss-EU 
bilateral agreements would most probably cost 
less than what the UK pays each year as a net 
financial contribution to EU membership 
(around 8.5 GBP billions in 2015).46  However, 
taking into account the size of the UK economy, 
the net contribution for the UK outside the EU 
might still reach several GBP billion. In 
addition, an issue which is often neglected in 
Brexit calculations is that many policies currently 
covered by the EU budget, such as agricultural 
subsidies and regional policies, would in the case 
of a Brexit have to be funded by the UK 
national budget. The increase in public spending 
could thus be considerable. As the Swiss 
example shows, more selective participation in 
the EU internal market, programmes and 
agencies thus comes with costs as well.  
4. RECENT EVOLUTIONS OF THE SWISS 
INTEGRATION MODEL 
The institutional question – the Swiss 
integration model soon to resemble the 
EEA?  
During the early 2000s, the bilateral agreements 
between the EU and Switzerland were 
implemented rather successfully: Swiss-EU 
relations were stable and the Swiss economy 
reached relatively high growth rates. In 2006, the 
Swiss government declared that EU accession 
was no longer a strategic goal,47 and in 2010 it 
stated that bilateralism should become a long-
term rather than an intermediate solution.48 This 
decision was a tipping point for the EU – stuck 
with agreements they had considered as 
provisional, the Council and the Commission 
started to question a range of issues related to 
the bilateral agreements. Subsequently, the 
Council of the EU asked Switzerland to 
conclude a new institutional agreement covering 
all existing agreements so as to make bilateralism 
sustainable for the long run.49  According to the 
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demands of the Council, Switzerland would 
have to adopt the evolution of relevant EU 
legislation in a “dynamic” manner. Swiss courts 
would have to follow the jurisprudence of the 
Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) regarding the 
interpretation of this acquis, and there would be 
a common settlement mechanism in case of 
disputes.50 While Switzerland reluctantly opened 
up to institutional negotiations in 2014, the talks 
are far from over and frustration is mounting in 
the European Commission.51  
Two observations are particularly telling for the 
British case. Firstly, the EU conditions the 
negotiations of any further bilateral agreements 
on finding a solution to the institutional 
question. As a result, Switzerland has been 
unable to conclude new market-access bilateral 
agreements with the EU for many years. This is 
particularly striking as some of these 
agreements, such as the market 
coupling/electricity agreement, would be quite 
beneficial for the EU. One can thus expect that 
similar conditions would apply to the UK if it 
were to negotiate bilateral agreements with the 
EU. In addition, it is unlikely that the EU would 
weaken its negotiation position towards 
Switzerland (and its relations with EEA EFTA 
countries) by allowing the UK to benefit from 
institutional opt-outs.  
Secondly, the wish list of how the overarching 
structure in the Swiss model should look – 
dynamic adaptation to the EU acquis, judicial 
enforcement, surveillance, etc. – would, if 
implemented, make the Swiss model resemble 
the institutional setup of the EEA. As recently 
pointed out by the former Norwegian Minister 
for EU and EEA Affairs, EEA Member States 
have little influence on the EU legislation that 
they incorporate. He further stated that while 
such an arrangement might work for small states 
such as Norway, he had a “hard time seeing the 
UK, with its global ambition, dedication and 
contributions, being comfortable with such an 
arrangement”.52 
The initiative on “mass immigration”: a 
major challenge for Swiss-EU relations 
 
The challenge posed by the institutional 
question is however incomparable with the 
conundrum emerging from the acceptance of 
the popular initiative53 “against mass 
immigration” by the Swiss. The initiative – 
which was accepted by a slim majority in 
February 2014 – states that yearly immigration 
to Switzerland should be limited by quotas. It 
also forbids Switzerland to conclude new 
international treaties in contradiction to these 
limitations. Meanwhile, existing incompatible 
treaties should be modified accordingly until 
early 2017.54  
While the initiative has at the time of writing not 
yet been implemented, it provoked an 
immediate rift in Swiss-EU relations. The 
European Commission declared that the 
initiative “goes against the principle of free 
movement of persons between the EU and 
Switzerland” and that the EU would “examine 
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the implications of this initiative on EU-Swiss 
relations as a whole”.55 Meanwhile, the Council 
declared that it expected Switzerland to “honour 
its obligations arising from the agreement on the 
free movement of persons”.56  
The Swiss Federal Council, which is responsible 
for the implementation of the initiative, has 
declared that it sees the introduction of 
quantitative limits as being incompatible with 
the bilateral agreement on the free movement of 
persons and hence requested a re-negotiation of 
that same agreement57. The EU has firmly 
rejected this request.58  
Shortly after the vote, Switzerland stated that it 
would be unable to sign the Protocol extending 
the bilateral agreement on the Free Movement 
of Persons to Croatia. “Countermeasures” 
followed, as the EU argued that conditions were 
no longer given to conclude the renewal of 
Switzerland’s participation in some EU 
programmes (on research and student exchange 
issues mainly). Under pressure from the inside 
and outside, the Swiss government backtracked 
and ratified the Croatian protocol. At the 
current stage, Switzerland’s long-term 
participation in these multi-billion programmes 
remains uncertain, especially if the initiative on 
“mass immigration” is to be implemented.  
With the EU refusing to re-negotiate the 
agreement on the free movement of persons 
and with the deadline of February 2017 
concerning the implementation of the initiative 
looming, it remains uncertain whether the 
agreement on the Free Movement of Persons 
will prevail.59 As the agreement is connected to 
all other Bilaterals I agreements, a termination 
would, in the worst-case scenario, terminate the 
entire Bilaterals I package – and thus end the 
Swiss integration model as we know it.   
 
On top of this, the EU Commission in April 
2015 stated that no market-access agreements 
would be concluded, even on a provisional 
basis, as long as no solution is found to making 
the initiative of mass immigration compatible 
with the bilateral agreements.60 Consequently, 
Switzerland was unable to join the new EU 
electricity market and was also barred from 
preparing a (much needed) agreement on 
financial services. This has led to major 
uncertainties for a range of sectors and 
companies reconsidering long-term investment 
in the country. 
CONCLUSION 
With the clock ticking towards an in-out 
referendum on 23 June 2016, a heated debate 
not only for or against staying in the European 
Union - but also on possible alternatives to EU 
membership – is in full swing. The Swiss-EU 
bilateral agreements in particular have often 
been cited as a model for the UK in case of 
Brexit.  
This paper has sought to provide added value to 
this debate by explaining the origins and recent 
developments of the Swiss-EU agreements. It 
has argued that bilateralism is no blueprint for 
the future relations between the EU and the 
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UK. Historically, the Swiss integration journey 
was not as smooth as is often assumed and 
largely developed according to EU preferences 
and demands. In addition, it is worth noting that 
the EU-Swiss bilateralism recently went through 
serious difficulties and is now in a state of crisis 
– both due to the recent popular initiative on 
mass immigration, as well as the standstill on the 
institutional issues. In all likelihood, the main 
features of EU-Swiss bilateralism will change in 
the years to come in a direction less favourable 
to Swiss preferences for a flexible and sectorial 
integration.  
While it is not entirely clear what Brexit 
supporters would wish as an alternative to UK 
membership, the Swiss model clearly does not 
seem to fulfil their demands. Such an integration 
model would be long and difficult to develop. 
Moreover, it is unlikely to be precisely 
reproduced in the current context. For instance, 
the fact that there is an increasing pressure to 
take on evolving EU acquis in a dynamic 
manner means that the Swiss integration model 
does not necessarily give the freedom to pick-
and-choose. Per se, this situation poses 
important problems regarding sovereignty. 
Similarly, the fact that Switzerland does not have 
access to decision-making, and only limited 
access to decision-shaping, raises a range of 
questions about sovereignty and democratic 
accountability. This is very important, as 
sovereignty preservation is often one of the core 
issue at stake for most British Eurosceptics.  
In conclusion, as the Norwegian review of the 
EEA noted, there is no way for highly 
developed European economies to “hide” from 
the EU internal market’s economic and 
normative attraction force.61 So far, small 
countries, such as Switzerland or the other 
EFTA States have managed to find agreements 
that have – at least for the time being – satisfied 
demands on both sides, especially because these 
countries are small and therefore ready to pay a 
sovereignty price for their non-accession. The 
Swiss model in particular does however not 
seem to offer a blueprint for the UK.  
The paper has earlier been published by the 
Swiss grassroots think-tank foraus and is 
available in its original version here: 
http://goo.gl/N52ndL.  
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